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RECENT LEGISLATION
ABROGATION OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN CONTRACT
CASES IN MARYLAND
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1976 the Maryland General Assembly enacted legislation
which prohibits both state and local units of government from
raising the defense of sovereign immunity in certain contract cases.'
The Act provides that the defense of sovereign immunity cannot be
raised in "an action in contract based upon a written contract
' 2
executed after July 1, 1976, on behalf of the state or a political
subdivision "by an official or employee acting within the scope of his
authority."3 Suit must be brought against the state or political
subdivision "within one year from the date on which the claim arose
or within one year after completion of the contract ... whichever is
later. ' 4 The state and local governments are not, however, liable for
punitive damages.5 To implement the Act, the state, municipalities
and counties are required to provide adequate funds in their budgets
for the satisfaction of final judgments against them. 6 The prohibi-
tion of the Act extends to the state, chartered counties, code counties,
counties governed by county commissioners, and municipal corpora-
tions, as well as to the officers, departments, agencies, boards and
commissions thereof.7
Prior to the enactment of this legislation, the Maryland courts
had steadfastly adhered to the common law doctrine of sovereign
immunity which constituted a complete defense to any tort or
contract action against the state, unless, by specific legislative
exception, the state had consented to be sued in the particular
circumstances of the case." In contract cases, the doctrine did not
1. Law of May 4, 1976, ch. 450, 1976 Md. Laws 1180 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE art.
41, § 10A (Supp. 1976); art. 23A, § 1A (Supp. 1976); art. 25, § 1A (Supp. 1976); art.
25A, § 1A (Supp. 1976); art. 25B, § 13A (Supp. 1976)).
2. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 1OA(a) (Supp. 1976); art. 23A, § 1A(a) (Supp. 1976); art.
25, § 1A(a) (Supp. 1976); art. 25A, § 1A(a) (Supp. 1976); art. 25B, § 13A(a) (Supp.
1976).
3. Id.
4. Id. art. 41, § 1OA(c) (Supp. 1976); art. 23A, § 1A(c) (Supp. 1976); art. 25, § 1A(c)
(Supp. 1976); art. 25A, § 1A(c) (Supp. 1976); art. 25B, § 13A(c) (Supp. 1976).
5. Id. art. 41, § 10A(b) (Supp. 1976); art. 23A, § 1A(b) (Supp. 1976); art. 25, § 1A(b)
(Supp. 1976); art. 25A, § 1A(b) (Supp. 1976); art. 25B, § 13A(b) (Supp. 1976).
6. Id. art. 41, § 1OA(d) (Supp. 1976); art. 23A, § 1A(d) (Supp. 1976); art. 25, § 1A(d)
(Supp. 1976); art. 25A, § 1A(d) (Supp. 1976); art. 25B, § 13A(d) (Supp. 1976).
7. Id. art. 41, § 10A (Supp. 1976); art. 23A, § 1A (Supp. 1976); art. 25, § 1A (Supp.
1976); art. 25A, § 1A (Supp. 1976); art. 25B, § 13A (Supp. 1976).
8. E.g., Calvert Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Dept. of Employment and Social Serv.,
277 Md. 372, 357 A.2d 839 (1976).
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fully extend to counties or municipalities. These political subdivi-
sions could cancel a contract entered into in the exercise of a
governmental function, but could not avoid liability for damages
incurred to the time of cancellation on the ground of sovereign
immunity. 9 The doctrine could not be evaded by bringing an action
nominally against an officer or employee of the state. 10 On the other
hand, officers or employees of the state could be personally sued for
actions taken without right or authority.1 1
II. ANALYSIS OF THE OPERATIVE SECTIONS OF THE ACT
Under the Act the defense of sovereign immunity cannot be
raised if the plaintiff meets three initial requirements: (1) the action
must be an "action in contract," (2) "based upon a written contract,"
(3) "executed on behalf of the state by an official or employee acting
within the scope of his authority."
12
The term "action in contract" is generally expressed in
contradistinction to the term "action in tort." The former flows from
the breach of a duty arising out of a contract, express or implied,
while the latter flows from the breach of a general duty imposed by
law. 13 Actions at law are generally divided into two classes, ex
contractu and ex delicto, ex contractu being the equivalent of an
"action in contract."'14 Under the Maryland Rules of Procedure, the
action of assumpsit is the proper form of action for recovery upon
causes of action arising in contract. 15 The legislature chose to limit
the scope of the Act to contract actions, thus leaving actions in tort
subject to the common law defense of sovereign immunity.' 6 The
distinctions between actions ex contractu and actions ex delicto,
however, have become somewhat blurred over the years.17 As a
result, it is possible to frame a tort action as an action in contract. A
plaintiff could bring an action for breach of an implied contract for
services between the state and its citizens rather than a tort action
for negligence if, for example, the state's failure to clear the roads of
9. American Structures, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 278 Md. 356, 364 A.2d 55 (1976).
10. Stanley v. Mellor, 168 Md. 465, 178 A. 106 (1935). See generally MD. ANN. CODE
art. 32A, § 12A et seq. (1957) (the Attorney General has statutory authority to
defend state officers or employees acting within the scope of their employment);
art. 78A, § 16c (1957).
11. United States v. Cordy, 58 F.2d 1013 (D. Md. 1932).
12. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 1OA(a) (Supp. 1976); art. 23A, § 1A(a) (Supp. 1976); art.
25, § 1A(a) (Supp. 1976); art. 25A, § 1A(a) (Supp. 1976); art. 25B, § 13A(a) (Supp.
1976).
13. International Printing Pressmen & Ass'ts Union v. Smith, 145 Tex. 399, 198
S.W.2d 729, 735-37 (1947).
14. Md. Rules 340, 342.
15. Md. Rule 340(b)(1).
16. See Law of May 4, 1976, ch. 450, 1976 Md. Laws 1180-81 (preamble).
17. See 1 H. SACHS, JR., POE'S PLEADING AND PRACTICE § 52 (6th ed. 1970)
[hereinafter cited as 1 H. SACHS, JR.].
338 [Vol. 6
Recent Legislation
ice and snow proximately caused an accident.' 8 To avoid that
possibility, 19 the legislature specified that actions in contract must
be based upon a "written contract.
' 20
A written contract is generally defined as one in which all terms
are in writing.21 Whether a contract partly in writing and partly oral
would be considered a written contract within the meaning of the
Act is potentially a matter of some dispute22 since the phrase has no
single or uniform meaning,23 Professor Corbin suggests that the
term "written contract" should be interpreted in light of the
circumstances surrounding the passage of the legislation:
The meaning that is intended to be conveyed by [the term
"written contract,"] when used . . . by a legislature in a
statute, must be determined by the usual processes of
interpretation in the light of all the relevant surrounding
circumstances. The same is true as to the meaning that is in
fact conveyed to one who hears or reads it. When such
meanings, so determined, are at variance it depends upon
our opinions of policy and justice whether legal effect shall
be given to any one of them or to none. Often the choice will
depend primarily upon the purpose with which the term is
used . . .by the legislature.24
In light of the legislative purpose in inserting the term "written
contract" into the Act, the Maryland courts should broadly construe
this term. Contracts partly oral and partly written should be
considered written contracts, provided the essential terms are in
writing, and notwithstanding the fact that parol evidence may be
necessary to supply additional terms.
Beyond these executional ambiguities, there remains the
problem of what kinds of written agreements are comprehended by
the term "contract." For example, an issue may arise as to whether a
18. REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION TO STUDY SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY, app.
B-13 (1976) [hereinafter cited as GOVERNOR'S REPORT].
19. See discussion p. 346 infra; in which it is noted that the legislature inserted the
term "written contract" after the governor vetoed a previous bill providing for
liability in "any action of contract." In his veto message, the governor expressed
his concern that a contract action might be brought construing essential
government services to be an implied contract.
20. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 10A(a) (Supp. 1976); art. 23A, § 1A(a) (Supp. 1976); art.
25, § 1A(a) (Supp. 1976); art. 25A, § 1A(a) (Supp. 1976); art. 25B, § 13A(a) (Supp.
1976).
21. Railway Passenger & Freight Conductors' Mut. Aid & Benefit Ass'n v. Loomis,
142 Ill. 560, 32 N.E. 424, 426 (1892).
22. Compare Novosk v. Reznick, 323 Ill. App. 544, 550, 56 N.E.2d 318, 321 (1944) (a
contract is not in writing unless all the terms are in writing, thus, a contract is
considered an oral contract if parol evidence is necessary to supply any missing
term) with Stanley v. Chastek, 34 Ill. App. 2d 220, 180 N.E.2d 512, 519-20 (1962);
Lyons v. Moise's Ex'r., 298 Ky. 858, 183 S.W.2d 493 (1944) (a contract is a written
contract when the essential terms are in writing notwithstanding the fact that
parol evidence is necessary to supply a missing term).
23. 1 A. CORBIN, A COMPREHENSIVE TREATISE ON THE WORKING RULES OF




lease is a contract within the meaning of the Act.25 In an action
against the state on a written lease, the state may argue that the Act
did not abrogate sovereign immunityince, at common law, a lease
is not a contract but a conveyance of an interest in real property.
26
In opposition to this theory, a plaintiff could argue that under the
modern view, a lease is a contract for the purchase of a possessory
interest in real property. 27 There is some indication that the
Maryland Court of Appeals would consider a written lease to be a
written contract within the meaning of the Act.28 In Progressive
Friendship Savings and Loan Association v. Rose,29 in which a
corporate tenant sued a sub-tenant for rent, the court stated that a
lease is a form of contract subject to the general rules governing the
creation and construction of contracts. 30 To complete the argument,
since a suit for rent under a written lease may be brought in
assumpsit, 31 which is an action in contract, 32 two statutory
requirements have been satisfied.
Assuming a breach can be proven, the plaintiff then must show
that the written lease was "executed on behalf of the state" 33 or a
political subdivision "by an official or employee acting within the
scope of his authority. ' '34 The term "scope of authority" is not
capable of accurate definition. 35 In the law of agency, however, it
has been held to include both actual and apparent authority.
36
Article 31, Section 3 of the Maryland Code provides:
An officer or agent of the State or any county, township or
municipal corporation, who is charged or entrusted with the
construction, improvement or keeping in repair of any
25. From time to time, issues may arise as to whether certain written agreements are
written contracts. The discussion of whether a written lease is a written contract
is intended only to be illustrative of these questions.
26. Cf. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.11 (A. Casner ed. 1952) (Professor Casner
notes that a lease is both a conveyance and a contract, although the covenants
in a lease are not mutually dependent so that a breach of the landlord's
covenants generally does not relieve the tenant of his obligation to pay rent).
27. Arthur Treacher's Fish & Chips, Inc. v. Children Terrace Ltd. Partnership, 272
Md. 720, 327 A.2d 282 (1974); Phoenix Savings and Loan, Inc. v. Striner
Enterprises, Inc., 265 Md. 205, 209, 288 A.2d 902, 904-05 (1972); Progressive
Friendship Savings and Loan Ass'n v. Rose, 235 Md. 169, 201 A.2d 8 (1964).
28. Arthur Treacher's Fish & Chips, Inc. v. Children Terrace Ltd. Partnership, 272
Md. 720, 327 A.2d 282 (1974); Phoenix Savings and Loan, Inc. v. Striner
Enterprises, Inc. 265 Md. 205, 209, 288 A.2d 902, 904-05 (1972); Progressive
Friendship Savings and Loan Ass'n v. Rose, 235 Md. 169, 201 A.2d 8 (1964).
29. 235 Md. 169, 201 A.2d 8 (1964).
30. Id. at 174, 201 A.2d at 11.
31. 1 H. SACHS, JR., supra note 17, § 132.
32. Md. Rule 340(b)(1).
33. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 1OA(a) (Supp. 1976); art. 23A, § 1A(a) (Supp. 1976); art.
25, § 1A(a) (Supp. 1976); art. 25A, § 1A(a) (Supp. 1976); art. 25B, § 13A(a) (Supp.
1976).
34. Id.
35. See Robards v. P. Bannon Sewer Pipe Co., 130 Ky. 380, 113 S.W. 429, 431 (1908);
Adams v. S.C. Power Co., 200 S.C. 438, 441-42, 21 S.E.2d 17, 18-19 (1942).
36. Angerosa v. White Co., 248 App. Div. 425, 432-33, 290 N.Y.S. 204, 208-09 (1936).
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building or work of any kind, or with the management or
providing for any public institution, shall not make any
contract binding or purporting to bind the State, or any
county, township or any municipal corporation to pay any
sum of money not previously appropriated for the purpose
for which such contract is made, and remaining unex-
pended, and applicable to such purpose, such officer or agent
who wilfully or knowingly makes or participates in making
a contract without such appropriation or authority, shall be
personally liable thereon, and the State, county, township or
municipal corporation in whose name or behalf the same
was made, shall be not liable thereon.
37
This provision requires that in order to be acting within the
scope of his authority, an officer or agent of the state or political
subdivision must have been entrusted with the performance of some
governmental function. 38 In addition, the officer or agent must have
entered into a contract for the payment of money on behalf of the
state pursuant to a specific, unexpended legislative appropriation for
the purposes of that contract.3 9 This would seem to limit the
authority of state agents to bind the state contractually to specific
actual authority, thus precluding the liability of the state or political
subdivisions on contracts made by agents acting under apparent
authority.
A potential problem which may affect the interaction between
Article 31 and the Act is the difference between "officer or agent" as
used in Article 31, and "official or employee" as used in the Act.
Arguably, there is no genuine distinction in fact between the two
provisions inasmuch as an official would likely be considered an
officer, and an employee an agent.40 A more significant problem is
whether an entity is an agency of the state. In Board of Trustees of
Howard Community'College v. John K. Ruff, Inc.,41 the Maryland
Court of Appeals looked to the following factors in determining that
the Board of Trustees of a community college was a state agency:
whether there is substantial state funding;42 whether there is the
power of eminent domain; whether the state establishes general
policies of operation; and whether the powers are bestowed by public
general laws.43 Once this analysis reveals that the entity is an
37. MD. ANN. CODE art. 31, § 3 (1957).
38. MD. ANN. CODE art. 31, § 3 (1957) describes in broad terms such governmental
functions as improving or repairing buildings or providing for any public
institution.
39. Id.
40. Marine v. Service Trucking Co., 225 Md. 315, 170 A.2d 188 (1960) (employee
synomymous with servant); Heiliger v. Sheldon, 236 Iowa 146, 18 N.W.2d 182,
189 (1945) (officer equivalent to official). See also W. SEAVY, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF AGENCY §6 (1964).
41. 278 Md. 580, 366 A.2d 360 (1976).
42. In this case, a 50% funding by the state was considered substantial.
43. 278 Md. at 586-87, 366 A.2d at 364.
1977] Recent Legislation 341
Baltimore Law Review
agency of the state, the only remaining determination is whether the
official or employee acted within the scope of his authority.
The Act provides a statute of limitations of one year from the
"date on which the claim arose or within one year after completion
of the contract giving rise to the claim, whichever is later."44 By
analogy to the general statute of limitations in the Maryland Code, 45
it can reasonably be concluded that the "date on which the claim
arose" is the equivalent of the date of breach. The statute provides
that a civil action is to be filed within three years from "the date it
accrues. '46 The Maryland Court of Appeals has held that in contract
actions, the statute of limitations begins to run from the date of the
alleged breach.47 Therefore, since "the date [the action] accrues"
means date of breach, the provision "date on which the claim arose"
in the Act should be given a similar interpretation.
With respect to suits against counties and municipalities, there
is a question as to whether the Maryland Code provision relating to
notice of claims against these potential defendants 48 applies to
actions in contract under the Act. The Code provides:
No action shall be maintained and no claims shall be
allowed against any municipal corporation or against any
county or Baltimore City for unliquidated damages for any
injury or damage to person or property unless within 180
days . . .written notice . . . shall be presented either in
person or by registered mail. ... 49
Although one could argue that the breach of a contractual obligation
is a claim for "unliquidated damages for . . .injury or damage to
person or property, '5 0 the cases arising under this statute are
exclusively tort cases. 5 1 The notice of claims provision seems to deal
with tort rather than contract actions. The rationale underlying this
provision may be that because the general statute of limitations for
civil actions runs for three years, the notice requirement would assist
the counties and municipalities in marshalling the facts for their
defense since over a three year period evidence may be lost,
memories may fade and witnesses may become unavailable. Under
the one year limitations of the Act, this danger is minimized.
44. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 1OA(c) (Supp. 1976); art. 23A, § 1A(c) (Supp. 1976); art.
25, § 1A(c)(Supp. 1976); art. 25A, § 1A(c) (Supp. 1976); art. 25B, § 13A(c) (Supp.
1976).
45. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-101 (1974).
46. Id.
47. Mumford v. Staton, Whaley & Price, 254 Md. 697, 255 A.2d 359 (1969); Killen v.
George Washington Cemetery, Inc., 231 Md. 337, 190 A.2d 247 (1963).
48. MD. ANN. CODE art. 57, § 18 (Supp. 1976).
49. Id. § 18(a) (Supp. 1976).
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., Loewinger v. Prince George's County, 266 Md. 316, 292 A.2d 67 (1972);
Rich v. Mayor of Baltimore, 265 Md. 647, 290 A.2d 777 (1972); Jackson v. Bd. of
County Comm'rs, 233 Md. 164, 195 A.2d 693 (1963).
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Several potential difficulties inhere in the Act's mandate that
the state and local governments budget adequate funds annually for
the satisfaction of judgments against them.52 In Board of Trustees of
Howard Community College v. John K. Ruff, Inc.,53 the lower court
found the board of trustees liable under a contract entered into prior
to the effective date of the Act, in which it agreed to pay the general
contractor's sales taxes on building materials. The Maryland Court
of Appeals found that the legislature had expressly given its consent
to suits against the boards of trustees of community colleges by a
previous statute.54 Despite the statutory consent to be sued, the court
raised the defense of sovereign immunity sua sponte, holding that
the defense would still be viable if funds had not been appropriated
for the purpose of satisfying the judgment and funds could not be
provided by taxation.55 The court then remanded the case for a
determination of whether there were any funds available to satisfy a
judgment since the court determined as a matter of law that the
board does not have the power to raise funds by taxation.56
In a post-Act case, although prohibited from raising the defense
of sovereign immunity specifically, the state or local government
might recite at trial or on appeal the fact that no funds were
currently available, that the particular governmental unit did not
have the power to tax, and that a court is not a unit of government
within the meaning of the Act.57 The court would then have an
opportunity to raise the defense. It is clear, however, that the Act
contemplates that the state or local government will budget
adequate funds after judgment has been rendered, since the Act
states, for example, that "the Governor annually shall provide in the
State budget adequate funds for the satisfaction of any final
judgment, after the exhaustion of any right of appeal, which has
been rendered against the State. . .. ,,58 Since the Act envisions
52. See note 6 supra, and accompanying text.
53. 278 Md. 580, 366 A.2d 360 (1976).
54. MD. ANN. CODE art. 77A § 1 (1-1) (Supp. 1976).
55. The court followed the holding in Univ. of Md. v. Maas, 173 Md. 554, 197 A. 123
(1938), in which the plaintiffs contract claim was precluded by the defense of
sovereign immunity even though the legislature had provided that the university
could be sued, because no funds were available, and the university could not
raise funds by taxation.
56. Bd. of Trustees of Howard Community College v. John K. Ruff, Inc., 278 Md. 580,
595-96, 366 A.2d 360, 369 (1976).
57. See Smith v. Higinbothom, 187 Md. 115, 48 A.2d 754 (1946). Quite summarily, the
author concludes that a court is not such a governmental unit since the general
term "other unit of state government" should, under the rule of ejusdem generis,
be interpreted in light of the preceding phrase which mentions only officers or
units of government within the executive branch. If, however, the governmental
unit was a county or municipality the court would be precluded from raising the
absolute defense of sovereign immunity since the doctrine never fully extended to
these entities. See note 9 supra.
58. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41 § 1OA(d) (Supp. 1976); art. 23, § 1A(d) (Supp. 1976); art. 25,




appropriations only after a final judgment, it would be inappropriate
for the courts to raise the defense of sovereign immunity sua sponte
before the governor and the legislature had an opportunity to
provide the funds as contemplated in the Act.
An added benefit in appropriating funds after judgment is that
the state budgetary process is rendered more certain, since the state
is not required to speculate as to the amount of judgments to be
rendered in any given year. The disadvantage with this approach is
that successful plaintiffs may be denied the ability to collect on a
judgment for a substantial period of time. If, for example, a claimant
were to receive a judgment against the state immediately after the
fiscal budgetary process had been completed, the litigant would have
to wait for an entire year for satisfaction. When there is a
substantial delay from judgment to collection, it is conceivable that
the successful plaintiff would be denied interest since the Act makes
no mention of additional appropriations for interest payments. The
apparent policy behind the denial of interest payments is that since
the claimant is being given a right which he would not otherwise
possess, he should not be given additional benefits at the expense of
the taxpayer. On the other hand, the successful plaintiff is being
denied the use of his funds for a substantial period of time without
compensation. On balance, the litigant should be able to collect
interest on his judgment. This conclusion is supported by the
legislative policy in passing the Act.59 The General Assembly
recognized that the state has a moral obligation to fulfill contractual
obligations just like any other contracting party. Requiring the state
to pay interest on judgments is, therefore, consistent with this policy.
Should the state legislature or local government refuse to
appropriate sufficient funds in any given year, there is currently no
procedure whereby judgments may be resubmitted in subsequent
years. 60 The legislature should deal with this problem by providing
that unsatisfied judgments be given priority based on date of
judgment when appropriations are made available. If the legislature
should fail to do so, in an appropriate case, the court should adopt a
rule that the priority of satisfaction should be based on date of
judgment.
III. LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL HISTORY OF SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY IN MARYLAND
Although the doctrine of sovereign immunity is a product of the
common law and although courts in other states have abrogated
sovereign immunity in contract by judicial decision,61 the Maryland
59. See Law of May 4, 1976, ch. 450, 1976 Md. Laws 1180-81.
60. The successful plaintiff would be left Without a remedy since, presumably, a
plaintiff cannot execute on judgments rendered against the state.
61. E.g., Kersten Co. v. Dep't of Social Servs., 207 N.W.2d 117 (Iowa 1973).
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Court of Appeals had been unwilling to do so in light of the history
of the doctrine in this state.62 In 1786, the legislature provided that
Maryland citizens could sue the state for money damages and that if
a jury found for the plaintiff the state was required to pay the
amount of judgment.6'3 This Act, however, was repealed in 1820.64
The court also considered the circumstances surrounding the case of
St. John's College v. State65 to be further evidence that the power to
sue the state must come from the legislature. In 1858, the General
Assembly passed a resolution tantamount to giving its consent for
the state to be sued in this particular case.66 The fact that prior
legislative approval was necessary-to permit the litigation was used
by the court to bolster its view that any change in the doctrine of
sovereign immunity must come from the legislature.67 These actions
of the General Assembly were interpreted by the court as clear
evidence that the legislature believed itself to be the appropriate
branch of government to deal with. sovereign immunity. The court
seemed to ignore the fact that since sovereign immunity is a judge-
made doctrine, legislative intervention should be unnecessary for its
abrogation. 68 The repeal in 1820 of a prior legislative abrogation of
sovereign immunity could have been interpreted as handing the
matter back to the court to. exercise its discretion concerning a
common law doctrine, and not as expressing the desire that the
matter remain a legislative prerogative. 69
Realizing the total-reluctance of the courts to modify the doctrine
of sovereign immunity in contract cases, 70 the legislature made
several attempts to make the change by statute. The first attempt
came in 1973 when Delegate Joseph E. Owens (D-Montgomery
County) introduced House Bill 1119 which provided that the state
and local governments are "liable in any action of contract, and may
not raise the defense of sovereign immunity, for any contract made
by the state" 71 or local government. This bill died in a Senate
committee after passing the House. 72 The next year Delegate Owens
62. Calvert Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Dep't of Employment & Social Servs., 277
Md. 372, 357 A.2d 839 (1976).
63. Law of Jan. 20, 1786, ch. 53, 1786 Md. Laws (repealed 1820).
64. Law of Feb. 17, 1820, ch. 210, 1820 Md. Laws.
65. 15 Md. 330 (1860).
66. H.J. Res. 4, 1858 Md. Laws 663.
67. Calvert Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Dep't of Employment & Social Servs., 277
Md. 372, 376-77, 357 A.2d 839, 841 (1976).
68. See Stone v. Ariz., 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107, 113 (1963); Kersten Co. v. Dep't of
Social Servs., 207 N.W.2d 117, 118 (Iowa 1973).
69. But see Charles E. Brohawn & Bros., Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of Chesapeake
College, 269 Md. 164, 304 A.2d 819 (1973). As recently as 1973 the court of appeals
held that contract suits could not be maintained against the state, unless, by
statute, the state has specifically consented to be sued in the circumstances of
that particular case.
70. Id.
71. H.D. No. 1119, 1973 Sess.
72. GOVERNOR'S REPORT 100 (1976).
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again filed a similar bill.73 Although it passed both houses of the
legislature, the governor vetoed for several reasons. 74 First, the bill
did not specifically appropriate funds to satisfy final judgments. The
governor considered such a provision essential to any legislation
dealing with sovereign immunity in light of the views then
prevailing in the Maryland Court of Appeals. In University of
Maryland v. Maas,75 the court had held that, even if sovereign
immunity had been abrogated, a contract action is subject to the
defense if no funds are available to satisfy the judgment and the
agency sued cannot raise funds by taxation. 76 Secondly, the
governor was concerned that liability under this bill "would far
exceed its intended effect" in that the state might be liable in actions
alleging breach of, an implied contract to provide governmental
services.
77
During the next session of the General Assembly in 1975,
Delegate Owens filed a revised bill which included a provision that
the immunity defense could not be raised in any action on a written
contract, 78 thereby eliminating the possibility that an action could
be brought on an implied contract for essential governmental
services. The bill was similar to the 1976 Act in requiring that the
governor and the governing bodies of the counties and municipali-
ties provide adequate funds in their budgets for the satisfaction of
any judgments. 79 The governor again exercised his veto power after
the bill passed both houses of the legislature. Despite the require-
ment that the governor budget adequate funds for the satisfaction of
any judgment, the governor felt that there was nothing to prevent
the General Assembly from deleting these funds. In addition, it was
uncertain whether the bill complied with the court's opinion in
University of Maryland v. Maas8 0 which held that even if immunity
has been abrogated, a contract action would be subject to the defense
of sovereign immunity if no funds were available and the agency
could not raise funds by taxation.8 '
Finally, in 1976, the present statute was enacted and signed into
law by the governor. It is interesting to note that the funding
provisions of the 1975 bill remained intact despite the infirmities
which the governor recognized. However, the Act differs from the
previous proposals in several respects. First, the 1976 Act prohibits
the state and local governments from raising the defense "in the
73. H.D. No. 5, 1974 Sess.
74. GOVERNOR'S REPORT, app. B-12 (1976).
75. 173 Md. 554, 197 A. 123 (1938).
76. Id. at 559, 197 A. at 125.
77. See note 74 supra.
78. H.D. No. 1672, 1975 Sess.
79. Compare id. with MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 1OA(d) (Supp. 1976); art. 23A, § 1A(d)
(Supp. 1976); art. 25, § 1A(d) (Supp. 1976); art. 25A, § 1A(d) (Supp. 1976); art. 25B,
§ 13A(d) (Supp. 1976).
80. 173 Md. 554, 197 A. 123 (1938).
81. Id. at 559, 197 A. at 125.
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courts of this state in an action in contract based upon a written
contract. '8 2 Prior bills used the term "action of contract," but this
distinction is insignificant since both terms refer to actions ex
contractu. The 1976 Act also states that punitive damages are not
permitted in such suits, 83 and that the claim is subject to a one year
statute of limitations.84 Prior bills were silent on both points.
Although previous bills made no mention of exhausting the right of
appeal, the 1976 Act provides that the governor and governing
bodies shall provide "adequate funds for the satisfaction of any final
judgment, after the exhaustion of any right of appeal, which has
been rendered"' against the state or local governments.
IV. BASES OF THE DOCTRINE AND APPROACHES IN
OTHER JURISDICTIONS
An often-quoted paragraph from the 1871 case of State v.
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad6 states that "immunity belongs to the
state by reason of her prerogative as a sovereign, and on the grounds
of public policy. '87 At common law, the basis of the doctrine was
that the king or sovereign was above the law and could do no
wrong. 8 The prevailing rationale in more recent times has been that
suits against the state would deplete the treasury of funds necessary
for the day-to-day operation of government.89 Many jurisdictions
have found this rationale unpersuasive. 90 For example, the courts in
Delaware, Missouri and North Carolina have held that the state has
waived its immunity defense in contract cases when the contract
was legislatively authorized. 91 The state courts have found an
overriding policy that "[a] truly democratic government should
observe the same rules of conduct that it requires of its citizens." 92 A
Delaware court assumed that when the legislature authorizes a state
agency to enter into contracts, the legislature contemplates a valid
82. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 1OA(a) (Supp. 1976); art. 23A, § lA(a) (Supp. 1976); art.
25, § 1A(a) (Supp. 1976); art. 25A, § 1A(a) (Supp. 1976); art. 25B, § 13A(a) (Supp.
1976).
83. Id. art. 41, § 1OA(b) (Supp. 1976); art. 23A, § 1A(b) (Supp. 1976); art. 25, § 1A(b)
(Supp. 1976); art. 25A, § 1A(b) (Supp. 1976); art. 25B, § 13A(b) (Supp. 1976).
84. Id. art. 41, § 1OA(c) (Supp. 1976); art. 23A, § 1A(c) (Supp. 1976); art. 25, § 1A(c)
(Supp. 1976); art. 25A, § 1A(c) (Supp. 1976); art. 25B, § 13A(c) (Supp. 1976).
85. Id. art. 41, § 1OA(d) (Supp. 1976); art. 23A, § 1A(d) (Supp. 1976); art. 25, § 1A(d)
(Supp. 1976); art. 25A, § 1A(d) (Supp. 1976); art. 25B, § 13A(d) (Supp. 1976)
(emphasis added).
86. 34 Md. 344 (1871).
87. Id. at 374.
88. Ace Flying Serv., Inc. v. Colorado Dep't of Agriculture, 136 Colo. 19, 24, 314 P.2d
278, 281 (1957).
89. Id.
90. See 53 N.C. L. REV. 1114 (1975).
91. George & Lynch, Inc. v. State, 57 Del. 158, 197 A.2d 734 (1967); V. S. DiCarlo
Constr. Co. v. State, 485 S.W.2d 52 (Mo. 1972); Smith v. State, 23 N.C. App. 423,
209 S.E.2d 336 (1974).
92. Smith v. State, 23 N.C. App. 423, 426, 209 S.E.2d 336, 338 (1974).
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contract,9 3 and, traditionally, contracts are valid only when there is
mutuality of obligations between the parties. 94 A contrary view is
seen as attributing to the legislature a desire that its citizens expend
large sums of money to carry out their contractual obligations to the
state while denying them any right to enforce the state's obligations,
thereby profiting the state at the citizen's expense.9 5 There is
justification for judicially abrogating sovereign immunity in that it
is a common law doctrine.96 Since sovereign immunity is a judge-
made doctrine, legislative intervention should not be necessary for
its abrogation. 97 The problem inherent in judicial abrogation is that
the legislature ultimately has the responsibility to appropriate funds
to satisfy judgments adverse to the state. For example, after the
Iowa Supreme Court did away with the state's immunity in contract
suits, it was unclear how judgments were to be handled, and
legislative action was considered necessary in order to satisfy a
judgment.98
This problem inheres not only when immunity is judicially
abrogated but also when the legislature acts to permit suits. If no
funds have been appropriated, sovereign immunity may still attach.
In Massachussetts, the legislature authorized suits against the state
and set up a procedure for payment of claims after judgment. 99 The
procedure required that the clerk of the court certify a copy of the
judgment to the state comptroller who in turn was to notify the
governor. The governor was then to draw a warrant for the proper
amount on the state treasurer, who then paid the same from any
appropriations earmarked for claims against the commonwealth. 100
A claimant made an attempt under this procedure to receive
payment on a compromise settlement negotiated with a state agency
in George A. Fuller Co. v. Commonwealth.101 Although the claim
was held to be invalid because the procedures outlined above were
not followed, 10 2 the court noted that it is a fundamental principle of
our system of government that the legislature has the sole power to
authorize payment of claims against the state by virtue of the fact
that it is the branch of government having the power to collect and
appropriate funds. 0 3 As a general rule, the above view is incorpo-
93. George & Lynch, Inc. v. State, 57 Del. 158, 197 A.2d 734, 736 (1964).
94. 1 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1 (3d ed. 1957).
95. Chapman v. State, 104 Cal. 690, 38 P. 457 (1894); Ace Flying Serv., Inc. v.
Colorado Dep't of Agriculture, 136 Colo. 19, 314 P.2d 278 (1957); George & Lynch,
Inc. v. State, 57 Del. 158, 197 A.2d 734 (1964); V. S. DiCarlo Constr. Co. v. State,
485 S.W.2d 52 (Mo. 1972); Smith v. State, 23 N.C. App. 423,209 S.E.2d 336 (1974).
96. Charles E. Brohawn & Bros. v. Board of Trustees of Chesapeake College, 269 Md.
164, 165, 304 A.2d 819, 820 (1973).
97. See Kersten Co. v. Dep't of Social Servs., 207 N.W.2d 117, 118 (Iowa 1973).
.98. See 59 IOWA L. REV. 360, 373-76 (1973).
99. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258 § 3 (West 1968).
100. Id.
101. 303 Mass. 216, 21 N.E.2d 529 (1939).




rated into statutes abrogating the state's immunity. For example,
Arizona requires that the governor report to the legislature all
judgments rendered against the state.10 4 Final payment of any




By the 1976 Act, Maryland has chosen to follow the lead of the
majority of states by limiting the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
The legislature should be commended for recognizing that "[t]here
exists a moral obligation on the part of any contracting party,
including the state or its political subdivisions to fulfill the
obligations of a contract."10 6 There are, however, several respects in
which the Act needs revision in order to remove ambiguity and
establish orderly procedures. First, by specifically amending the Act,
the legislature should remove all doubt as to whether the defense of
sovereign immunity may be raised in an action on a written lease.
Secondly, the Act should be amended to provide that a claimant
need not file a notice of claim with the county or municipality as
otherwise provided by statute.107 Thirdly, the Act should clarify the
budget procedure for the satisfaction of final judgments. Since the
Act contemplates appropriations after judgments have been ren-
dered, the Act should specify that the successful plaintiff is entitled
to interest from date of judgment. In light of the possibility that the
legislature might refuse to provide funds in any given year, the Act
should provide a procedure whereby unsatisfied judgments are given
priority based on date of judgment when appropriations are later
made available.
The author recommends the following italicized changes in
Section 10A of Article 41, with parallel changes in Section 1A of
Articles 23A, 25, and 25A, and Section 13A of Article 25B to remedy
these problems:
(a) Unless otherwise specifically provided by the Laws of
Maryland, the State of Maryland, and every officer,
department, agency, board, commission, or other unit of
State government may not raise the defense of sovereign
immunity in the courts of this State in an action in contract
based upon a written contract, written lease, or any other
written agreement, executed on behalf of the State, or its
104. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-826 (West 1956).
105. Id. § 12-826(c); see also Commonwealth v. Shamrock Corp., 501 S.W.2d 584 (Ky.
1973).
106. Law of May 4, 1976, ch. 450, 1976 Md. Laws 1181-82.
107. MD. ANN. CODE art. 57, § 18 (Supp. 1976).
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department, agency, board, commission, or unit by an
official or employee acting within the scope of his authority.
(d)(i) In order to provide for the implementation of this
section, the Governor annually shall provide in the State
budget adequate funds for the satisfaction of any final
judgment, with interest from date of judgment, after the
exhaustion of any right of appeal, which has been rendered
against the State, or any officer, department, agency, board,
commission, or other unit of government in an action in
contract as provided in this section.
(ii) Judgments against the State under this section shall
be reported to the Comptroller of the Treasury, who shall
maintain and annually report to the Governor an accounting
of existing judgments. Upon appropriation of funds by the
legislature, the Comptroller of the Treasury shall satisfy
existing judgments in the order of date of judgment.
As to counties and municipalities, a new subsection "e" should be
added to Section 1A of Articles 23A, 25, and 25A, and Section 13A of
Article 25B:
(e) A claimant need not file a notice of claim as provided in
Maryland Code, Article 57, Section 18, to maintain an action
in contract as provided under this section.
H. Dean Bouland
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